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Abstract
Humans have always been intrigued by their ability to reason. We have constantly attempted to emulate this
process, trying almost everything, from physiological explanations, to sociological accounts. The approach
with possibly the longest tradition conceives this process as a mere manipulation of symbols. Yet, symbolic
reasoning cannot be applied directly over the problem at hand: we require that the knowledge about that domain
be also described symbolically, where this description is in turn the outcome of the process called Knowledge
Representation.
Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) is a formalism that by combining Logic Programming with De-
feasible Argumentation is able to represent incomplete and potentially contradictory information. Its ability to
represent this kind of informartion make it suitable for describing many real world situations, where its infer-
ence engine can then later be used to solve concrete problems in those scenarios. In this article we propose a
formal methodology, striving to standardize the process of knowledge representation in DeLP, that defines a set
of guidelines to be used during this key task.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Humans have always been intrigued by their ability to reason, even before the invention of comput-
ers. For decades, we have been attempting to emulate the process of reasoning, but it proved to be
quite hard to capture in a practical sense. Scientist have tried almost everything, from physiological
explanations (involving even quantum physics [12]), to sociological accounts (for instance, problem
solving using the ant-colony metaphor [1]). Out of those approaches, the one with possibly the longest
tradition, going back at least to the golden age in classical Greece, conceives this process as a mere
manipulation of symbols [10]. This great insight produced nowadays the most usefull and versatile
creations at our disposal (computers included). However, symbolic reasoning cannot be applied di-
rectly over the problem at hand: we require that the knowledge about that particular domain be also
∗Partially supported by Agencia Nacional de Promocio´n Cientı´fica y Tecnolo´gica (PAV 2003 Nro. 076, PICT 2002
Nro. 13096, PICT 2003 Nro. 15043), CONICET (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientı´ficas y Te´cnicas de la
Repu´blica Argentina), and CIC (Comisio´n de Investigaciones Cientı´ficas de la Provincia de Buenos Aires).
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described symbolically, where this description is in turn the outcome of the process called Knowledge
Representation.
From a knowledge engineer standpoint, knowledge representation is the process upon which they
classifies all the information present in a given domain into two categories: the core characteristics
of the scenario under study, and the rest of the knowledge, that is, those other aspects deemed not
relevant considering the problem at hand. Although this may look simple or straight, this is by no
means a trivial task. Sometimes, it is more an art than a science, provided that what can be derived
applying this kind of reasoning is usually intrinsically intertwined with the way knowledge is being
represented. When dealing with this, what we actually require is a set of guidelines assuring us that
no core characteristics may mistakenly be ignored. In other words, we are looking for a methodology.
Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP) is a formalism that by combining Logic Programming with
Defeasible Argumentation is able to represent incomplete and potentially contradictory information.
Ideas borrowed from defeasible argumentation such as representing defeasible reasons as arguments
or performing a full dialectical analysis before answering queries are carefully added to a knowledge
representation language featuring PROLOG-like rules. Its ability to represent incomplete information
makes it suitable for describing many real world situations, where its inference engine can then later
be used to solve concrete problems in those scenarios. However, often times the results one may obtain
by adopting DeLP are directly related to the decisions (or lack thereof) made during this initial phase
of knowledge representation. As a consequence, in this article we propose a formal methodology,
striving to standardize the process of knowledge representation in DeLP, that defines a set of guidelines
to be used during this key task.
In what follows, Sect. 2 briefly introduces the inner working of DeLP. Then, Sect. 3 outlines the
proposed methodology for knowledge representation, illustrating its use with some examples from
the literature. Finally, Sect. 4 presents the conclusions obtained.
2 DEFEASIBLE LOGIC PROGRAMMING
This section briefly introduces DeLP’s essentials following its most recent formulation [6] (we refer
the reader looking for a more comprehensive presentation to its original formulation [5]).
The DeLP language is defined in terms of three disjoint sets: facts, strict rules, and defeasible
rules. Literals can be ground atoms (e.g., A), or their strong negation (e.g., ∼A). Facts are simply
literals. Strict rules are ordered pairs L0 ← L1, . . . , Ln whose first component, L0, is a literal,
and whose second component, L1, . . . , Ln, is a finite non-empty set of literals. In a like manner, a
defeasible rule is an ordered pair L0 −≺ L1, . . . , Ln whose first component, L0, is a literal, and whose
second component, L1, . . . , Ln, is a finite non-empty set of literals. Syntactically, the symbol ‘−≺’
is all that distinguishes a defeasible rule from a strict one. Pragmatically, defeasible rules are used to
represent defeasible knowledge (i.e., tentative information that can be used as long as nothing is posed
against it), whereas strict rules are used to represent non-defeasible knowledge (i.e., incontrovertible
information). Observe that both strict and defeasible rules induce a meta-relation between set of
literals, so the symbols ’←’ and ‘−≺’ have no interaction with the literals.
In this formalism, the state of the world is modelled as a Defeasible Logic Program (de.l.p), es-
sentially a possibly infinite set of facts, strict rules and defeasible rules. In a given de.l.p P , the subset
of facts and strict rules is referred to as Π, and the subset of defeasible rules as ∆. When required,
the de.l.p P can also be noted as (Π,∆). Since the set Π represent non-defeasible information, it is
assumed that it is non-contradictory, that is, no pair of complementary literals can be derived from it
at the same time. As usual, the literals that may be derived are obtained chaining as many rules and
facts as required.
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Definition 1. (strict and defeasible derivations) [6]
Let P = (Π,∆) be a de.l.p, and L a ground literal. A defeasible derivation of L from P , noted
P |∼ L, is a finite sequence L1, L2, . . . , Ln = L of ground literals, such that for every Li, 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
• Li ∈ Π (Li is one of the facts in Π), or
• there exists a strict or defeasible rule in P , with head Li and body B1, B2, . . . , Bm, such that
for every Bj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, there exists a k, 1 ≤ k < i, such that Bj = Lk.
Those defeasible derivations that only use facts and strict rules are also called strict derivations. 
Since modelling incomplete infomation usually gives rise to conflicting conclusions, we should
not accept at the same time all the literals that may be defeasible derived from a given program.
Only those derivations that constitute logical arguments are to be considered. In this formalism, an
argument is a tentative piece of reasoning supporting a given conclusion, that satisfies the following
restrictions:
Definition 2. (argument structure) [6]
Let h be a literal, and P = (Π,∆) be a de.l.p. We say that 〈A, h〉 is an argument structure for h, if,
and only if, A is a set of defeasible rules from P (i.e., A ⊆ ∆), such that:
• there exists a defeasible derivation for h from Π ∪ A,
• the set Π ∪ A is non-contradictory, and
• A is minimal with respect to set inclusion (i.e., no A′ ⊂ A satisfies the previous conditions).

Argument structures only contain the defeasible rules used in order to defeasible derive a given
conclusions. Even though one may be tempted to add the facts and strict rules used too, recall that
only defeasible rules may later be challenged (given that facts and strict rules, as such, cannot be
questioned). Also, argument structures are required to be minimal with respect to set inclusion. This
restriction, often forgotten in other theories of argumentation, is paramount in importance, since we
do not want to allow as sensible arguments those that include more “defeasible information” than
what is strictly required. Should we fail to do so, valid arguments might end up rejected on the
basis of a certain superfluous assumption that happens to be too weak. In a sense, this restriction
is embodying the sound principle that the strength of an argument must be related to the amount of
defeasible information upon which it depends.
Example 1. Let us consider the de.l.p P1 = (Π1,∆1), where:
Π1 ∆1
bird(X) <- penguin(X) flies(X) -< bird(X)
∼penguin(X) <- ∼bird(X)
∼flies(X) <- penguin(X)
penguin(pengo)
bird(tweety)
According toP1, 〈A, f lies(tweety)〉 constitutes an argument structure for flies(tweety), whereA =
{flies(tweety) −≺ bird(tweety)}, but, at the same time, it is impossible to formulate an argument
structure for flies(pengo), provided that the set of defeasible rules {flies(pengo) −≺ bird(pengo)}
allowing the derivation of flies(pengo) is in conflict with Π1, since Π1 |∼ ∼flies(pengo)). Therefore,
〈∅, ∼flies(pengo)〉 constitutes a valid argument structure for ∼flies(pengo).
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Having an argument structure for a certain conclusion is not enough to warrant it, since there may
also exist another argument structure for a conflicting conclusion.
Definition 3. (disagreement) [6]
Let P = (Π,∆) be a de.l.p and let L1 and L2 be two literals. We say that L1 disagrees with L2, if,
and only if, the set Π ∪ {L1, L2} is contradictory. 
This relation between literals is generalized to argument structures using the auxiliary notion of
sub-argument structure: we say that 〈A′, h′〉 is a sub-argument structure of 〈A, h〉 if, and only if,
A′ ⊆ A.
Definition 4. (counter-argumentation) [6]
Let 〈A1, h1〉 and 〈A2, h2〉 be two argument structures. We say that 〈A1, h1〉 counter-argues (also
rebuts or attacks) 〈A2, h2〉 at h if, and only if, there exists a sub-argument structure 〈A, h〉 from
〈A2, h2〉 such that h and h1 disagrees. 
Considering that 〈A, h〉 is one of its own sub-argument structures, this relation may become sym-
metric, and as such, might not be able to tell appart successful attacks from those that are not. Thus, it
must be further refined with the aid of an argument comparison criterion ‘Â’. By doing so, two types
of attacks can be distinguished:
Definition 5. (proper defeater) [6]
Let 〈A1, h1〉 and 〈A2, h2〉 be two argument structures. We say that 〈A1, h1〉 is a proper defeater for
〈A2, h2〉 at the literal h if, and only if, there exists a sub-argument structure 〈A, h〉 of 〈A2, h2〉, such
that 〈A1, h1〉 counter-argues 〈A2, h2〉 at h, and also 〈A1, h1〉 Â 〈A, h〉 (i.e., 〈A, h〉 is preferred over
〈A1, h1〉). 
Definition 6. (blocking defeat) [6]
Let 〈A1, h1〉 and 〈A2, h2〉 be two argument structures. We say that 〈A1, h1〉 is a blocking defeater for
〈A2, h2〉 at the literal h if, and only if, there exists a sub-argument structure 〈A, h〉 of 〈A2, h2〉, such
that 〈A1, h1〉 counter-argues 〈A2, h2〉 at h, and neither 〈A1, h1〉 Â 〈A, h〉 nor 〈A, h〉 Â 〈A1, h1〉 (i.e.,
〈A, h〉 and 〈A1, h1〉 are unrelated according Â). 
This distintion between defeaters will play a role in the upcoming dialectical analysis. In a sense,
a proper defeat denotes a more straightforward form of defeat than a blocking one. When required, we
say that an argument structure defeats another when the former is either a proper or blocking defeater
of the latter.
Regarding the argument-comparison criterion, DeLP provides a modular design where the knowl-
edge engineer can also specify which criterion is better suited for the domain at hand. Not whitstand-
ing, many attractive results have been achieved using a particular criterion called specificity, initially
introduced by Poole [13], later adapted for DeLP use as follows:
Definition 7. (generalized specificity) [6]
Let P = (Π,∆) be a de.l.p, and let ΠG be the set of all the strict rules in Π. Also, let F be the
set of all the literals that have a defeasible derivation from P (i.e., F is a set of facts). Finally, let
〈A1, h1〉 and 〈A2, h2〉 be two argument structures obtained from P . We say that 〈A1, h1〉 is strictly
more specific than 〈A2, h2〉 if, and only if, the following conditions hold:
1. For all H ⊆ F , whenever ΠG∪H ∪A1 |∼ h1 (i.e., H activates h1) and ΠG∪H 6|∼ h1 (i.e., a non
trivial activation), then it must be the case that ΠG ∪H ∪ A2 |∼ h2 (i.e., H also activates h2).
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2. There must exist a H ′ ⊆ F , such that ΠG∪H ′∪A2 |∼ h2 (i.e., H ′ activates h2) and ΠG∪H ′ 6|∼ h2
(i.e., a non trivial activation) , where ΠG ∪H ′ ∪ A1 6|∼ h1 (i.e., H ′ does not activate h1).

This criterion essentially reconciles two principles: on the one hand, it favors those argument
structures that are more informed, and on the other hand, it also favors those argument structures
involving shorter defeasible derivations.
Example 2. Let us consider the de.l.p P2 = (Π2,∆2), where:
Π2 ∆2
bird(X) <- penguin(X) flies(X) -< bird(X)
∼penguin(X) <- ∼bird(X) ∼flies(X) -< weak(X)
bird(tweety) ∼flies(X) -< penguin(X)
weak(tweety)
penguin(pengo)
In the context of P2, it is possible to formulate the following argument structures:
〈A1, f lies(pengo)〉, where A1 = {flies(pengo) −≺ bird(pengo)}.
〈A2, ∼flies(pengo)〉, where A2 = {∼flies(pengo) −≺ penguin(pengo)}.
〈A3, f lies(tweety)〉, where A3 = {flies(tweety) −≺ bird(tweety)}.
〈A4, ∼flies(tweety)〉, where A4 = {∼flies(tweety) −≺ weak(tweety)}.
Using generalized specificity as the argument-comparison criterion, 〈A2, ∼flies(pengo)〉 becomes a
proper defeater of 〈A1, f lies(pengo)〉, since the former is strictly more specific then the latter. Also,
〈A3, f lies(tweety)〉 and 〈A4, ∼flies(tweety)〉 block each other, since these argument structures are
unrelated under the chosen criterion.
In this formalism, a given literal is deemed warranted if we are able to find an argument structure
for it that remains undefeated after considering all its potential defeaters. Now, since defeaters are
in turn argument structures as well, there may exists defeaters for these defeaters, and so on. This
sequence of argument structures, each one defeating the previous one, is called in this context argu-
mentation line, in the sense that this exchange of reasons seems to be exploring a given aspect of the
controversy.
Definition 8. (argumentation line) [6]
Let P = (Π,∆) be a de.l.p and let 〈A0, h0〉 be an argument structure. We say that the sequence
of argument structures [〈A0, h0〉, 〈A1, h1〉, . . . , 〈An, hn〉, . . .] constitutes an argumentation line for
〈A0, h0〉, noted Λ〈A0,h0〉, if, and only if, every argument structure 〈Ai, hi〉, i ≥ 1, in Λ〈A0,h0〉 is such
that it defeats its immediate predecessor 〈Ai−1, hi−1〉. 
According to this definition, argumentation lines may be infinite. This concern is addressed re-
stricting the argumentation lines that may appear during the dialectical analysis of a certain claim,
considering that not every exchange of arguments actually constitutes a valid pattern of reasoning. For
instance, circular argumentation is a particular case of fallacious reasoning which should be avoided
at all cost. The occurrence of these undesired situations is prevented imposing a set of conditions over
the potential argumentation lines, distinguishing those that do not incur in any sort of fallacious rea-
soning as being acceptable. In order to do so, we must be able to tell appart those argument structures
supporting the initial claim from those that instead interfere with it.
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Definition 9. (support, interference) [6]
Let Λ〈A0,h0〉 = [〈A0, h0〉, 〈A1, h1〉, . . . , 〈An, hn〉, . . .] be an argumentation line for 〈A0, h0〉. We say
that the argument structures occupying the odd positions in Λ〈A0,h0〉 constitute the set of supporting
argument structures of Λ〈A0,h0〉, noted Λ〈A0,h0〉S , and that the argument structures occupying the even
positions in Λ〈A0,h0〉 constitute the set of interfering argument structures of Λ〈A0,h0〉, noted Λ〈A0,h0〉I 
Another concept required to formally define what constitute an acceptable argumentation line is
the notion of concordance, a generalization of the notion of being consistent with the strict knowledge.
Definition 10. (concordance) [6]
LetP = (Π,∆) be a de.l.p and S = {〈A1, h1〉, . . . , 〈An, hn〉} be a set of argument structures obtained
from P . We say that S is concordant if, and only if, the set (⋃ni=1Ai) ∪ Π is non-contradictory. 
All these notions are orchestrated together in the formal definition of what constitutes an accept-
able argumentation line:
Definition 11. (acceptable argumentation line) [6]
Let Λ〈A0,h0〉 = [〈A0, h0〉, 〈A1, h1〉, . . . , 〈An, hn〉, . . .] be an argumentation line for 〈A0, h0〉. We say
that Λ〈A0,h0〉 constitutes an acceptable argumentation line if, and only if, the following conditions
hold:
1. Λ〈A0,h0〉 is finite.
2. The sets Λ〈A0,h0〉S of supporting argument structures and Λ
〈A0,h0〉
I of interference argument struc-
tures are concordant.
3. No argument structure 〈Ai, hi〉 ∈ Λ〈A0,h0〉 is a sub-argument structure of a previous argument
structure 〈Aj, hj〉, with j < i.
4. If 〈Ai, hi〉, i ≥ 2, is a blocking defeater of 〈Ai−1, hi−1〉, then 〈Ai−1, hi−1〉 must be a proper
defeater of 〈Ai−2, hi−2〉.

Each argumentation line only explores a particular aspect of the controversy about the final state
of the initial claim. The complete dialectical analysis, which encompasses multiple argumentation
lines, is structured as a tree by virtue of the following recursive characterization:
Definition 12. (dialectical tree) [6]
Let 〈A0, h0〉 be an argument structure about h0. We say that the dialectical tree for 〈A0, h0〉, noted
T〈A0,h0〉, can be obtained as follows:
1. The root node must be labelled 〈A0, h0〉.
2. Let [〈A0, h0〉, 〈A1, h1〉, . . . , 〈An, hn〉] be the sequence of labels along a certain branch from
the root of the tree up to a node labelled 〈An, hn〉, an let 〈B1, q1〉, 〈B2, q2〉, . . . , 〈Bk, qk〉 be all
the defeaters of 〈An, hn〉. Then, for every defeater 〈Bi, qi〉 of 〈An, hn〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that
[〈A0, h0〉, 〈A1, h1〉, . . . , 〈An, hn〉, 〈Bi, qi〉] happens to be an acceptable argumentation line for
〈A0, h0〉, a new node labelled 〈Bi, qi〉 must be added as a child of the node labelled 〈An, hn〉.

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Finally, we can resort to the following bottom-up marking to determine the outcome of the dialec-
tical analysis just structured as a tree:
Definition 13. (marking of a dialectical tree) [6]
Let 〈A, h〉 be an argument structure and T〈A,h〉 its corresponding dialectical tree. The marking of
T〈A,h〉, noted T ?〈A,h〉, can be obtained as follows:
• All the leaves of T〈A,h〉 are marked U in T ?〈A,h〉.
• Let N be a inner node of T〈A,h〉. This node should be marked U if, and only if, all its children
nodes are marked D. If that is not the case, it should be marked U.

At last, this marking allows us to characterize the set of literals sanctioned by a given de.l.p, which
constitutes the semantics of this formalism.
Definition 14. (warrant) [6]
Let P = (Π,∆) be a de.l.p, and let h be a literal. We say that h is warranted if, and only if, there
exists an argument structure 〈A, h〉 for h, such that the root of its marked dialectical tree T ?〈A,h〉 bears
the mark U. 
After this succinct overview of DeLP, the next section develops the proposed methodology for
putting this framework to a good use.
3 A METHODOLOGY FOR KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
This section proposes a set of guidelines describing how different situations can be modeled within
DeLP. We begin by addressing the representation of monotonic knowledge in Sect. 3.1, to then con-
sider non-monotonic knowledge in Sect. 3.2.
3.1 Representing Monotonic Knowledge
Monotonic reasoning has been under study for hundreds, even thousands of years. Hence, its cor-
responding knowledge representation is also well understood. In what follows, we consider in de-
tail those aspects of monotonic knowledge representation which can be straightforwardly expressed
within DeLP.
3.1.1 Relational Databases
To begin with, the most essential form of symbolic knowledge one may want to represent is a set
atomic formulas, where in turn each formula states that a certain relation holds over a given tuple
of objects. This kind of knowledge can be represented in DeLP as a set of facts, much in the same
way this knowledge was represented in PROLOG. Bear in mind that the nature of these relations, or
the origin of the objects they relate cannot be inspected: it should be determined by the knowledge
engineer for each concrete scenario.
Remark 1. Let r be a finite relation over a certain domain. This relation can be modeled in de.l.p by
adding a new fact r(X) for every X ∈ r.
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The reader might notice only finite relations can be modelled following this approach. Then again,
the same holds for relational databases and PROLOG programs.
Example 3. The following de.l.p models the relation ‘weekend day’ defined over the days of the
week:
Π ∆
weekend(saturday)
weekend(sunday)
3.1.2 Class Inclusion
Another important piece of monotonic knowledge usually worth modeling is the inclusion of con-
cepts or categories. From Aristotle’s syllogisms to modern day inheritance hierarchies, being able to
represent class inclusion has always been deemed crucial. The classical approach consists in mod-
elling the inclusion of a concept A into the concept B with a material implication A(X) → B(X),
denoting that all the instances of the former are also instances of the latter. We can follow a simmilar
approach in DeLP, as long as we take into consideration that DeLP does not have material implication
but inference rules (meta-relations between set of formulas to be precise). That is to say:
Remark 2. Let A and B be two concepts, already modelled as relations among objects, such that A
is included in B. This knowledge can be expressed in a de.l.p by adding the strict rules b(X)← a(X)
and ∼a(X)← ∼b(X).
Much to our surprise, this result made us aware that all this time we have been modelling class in-
clusion the wrong way. Considering that this formalism is a refinement of Simari-Loui’s system [15],
where strict rules were material implications, we incorrectly kept modelling this notion with the first
rule alone, when in fact two rules were actually required.
Example 4. The following de.l.p models the fact that humans are mammals.
Π ∆
mammal(X) <- human(X)
∼human(X) <- ∼mammal(X)
3.1.3 Logic Programming
The paradigm of logic programming has been throughly explored as a tool for knowledge represen-
tation almost since its initial conception. Many attractive expert systems have been developed in
PROLOG, the most well-known exponent of this paradigm. In these systems, the knowledge is rep-
resented through a standard PROLOG program. These programs, by extending a finite set of facts
with general rules, allow the representation of infinite relations, something not possible using stan-
dard relational databases. These kind of knowledge can also be expresed in DeLP, since any standard
PROLOG program can be reformulated as a de.l.p as follows:
Remark 3. Let P be a definite PROLOG program. The knowledge represented by the program P can
be expressed as a de.l.p by virtue of the same set of facts and (strict) rules.
The previous remark rests upon the following proposition, relating the answers a given PROLOG
program returns with DeLP’s notion of warranted literals.
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Proposition. Let P be a definite PROLOG program. Then, q is a ground query entailed from P in
PROLOG if, and only if, q is a warranted literal from (Π,∆), where Π = P and ∆ = ∅.
Proof. (⇒)
If q is entailed from P , there must exist a SLD-derivation of q from P . Let L1, L2, . . . , Ln = q be
the sequence of literals compossing that SLD-derivation. Observe that this same sequence can also
be used to construct a strict derivation of q from P , provided the same restrictions apply to both
notions.1 Therefore, 〈∅, q〉 is a valid argument structure for q, if we take into account that q can be
defeasibly derived from P ∪ ∅, P ∪ ∅ is non-contradictory since PROLOG program cannot express
negative information, and that there are no subsets of ∅. This kind of argument structures (those based
on strict derivations) are quite particular. For instance, no other argument structure can defeat them,
no matter the argument-comparison criterion considered (this follows from Prop. 3.1 in [6]). That is
to say, its corresponding dialectical tree T〈∅,q〉 has only one node labelled 〈∅, q〉 and marked U, which
in turn means that q is a warranted literal of this de.l.p.
(⇐)
If q is a warranted literal from P , there must exist an argument structure 〈A, q〉 for q. According
to Def. 2, A ⊂ ∆, whereas ∆ = ∅. Therefore, A = ∅, which means that there must exist a strict
derivation of q from P . Let L1, L2, . . . , Ln = q be the sequence of literals compossing that strict
derivation. Once again, this same sequence can also be used to construct a SLD-derivation of q from
P . Finally, since there exists a SLD-derivation of q from P , q must be entailed from P . 
3.1.4 Negative Information
So far, only positive information was considered. Even though positive information is our preferred
source of knowledge, sometimes negative information constitutes a valid source of additional knowl-
edge. Both relational databases and PROLOG adopt some sort of Closed-World Assumption (CWA)
in order to represent this kind of information, but, by doing so, a subtle aspect is lost in the process:
CWA does not distinguish between not knowing whether a certain relation holds over some objects,
and knowing that this relation in fact does not hold over those objects. This issue has been addressed
in PROLOG giving birth to extended logic programming [7], a formalism that extends PROLOG allowing
the explicit representation of negative information. Following a simmilar approach, DeLP also allows
the representation of this kind of knowledge.
Remark 4. Let r be a relation and X a set of objects such that we have witnessed that X /∈ r. This
knowledge can be expressed in a de.l.p by adding a new fact ∼r(X).
3.1.5 Strong Conflicts
The conflict arising from complementary literals, called explicit conflict (for instance, “being alive”
and “not being alive”), is a situation that DeLP’s inference engine captures by itself. However, some-
times the conflict existing between a set of situations is more subtle (or less syntactic), and does not
involve complementary concepts (for instance, “being alive” and “being dead”). In a sense, this con-
flict represents a set of situations that cannot happen all at the same time. Let us call this kind of
conflict strong.
Remark 5. Let S1, S2, . . . , Sn be all the situations characterizing a strong conflict. This knowledge
can be expressed in a de.l.p by adding n new strict rules of the form ∼Si ← S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sn,
for every Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
1the formal demonstration of this statement, by virtue of structural induction, is trivial.
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Example 5. The following de.l.p captures the strong conflict between the notions of being alive and
being dead.
Π ∆
∼dead(X) <- alive(X)
∼alive(X) <- dead(X)
3.2 Representing Non-Monotonic Knowledge
Nonmonotic reasoning is a recent phenomenon [14, 8, 9], hence the representation of non-monotonic
knowledge is a topic still under exploration. Not withstanding, the comunity appear to be reaching
an initial agreement on some of its fundamental tenets. In what follows, we consider in detail some
classical aspects of the process of representing non-monotonic knowledge in DeLP.
3.2.1 Defaults
When it comes to make the case for non-monotic reasoning, most formal theories resort to argue that
there is a feature of common-sense reasoning which cannot be captured using monotonic theories:
defaults. A default establishes a connection between concepts weaker than class inclusion, yet rel-
evant enough as to require to be made explicit. Put the other way around, defaults can be used to
model relations with exceptions. The classical example in Artificial Intelligence is “birds usually fly”.
Observe that this relation cannot be expressed as class inclusion (e.g., “birds fly”), because it becomes
inconsistent with the fact that some birds do not fly (e.g., penguins, ostriches, kiwis, etc.), nor it can
be expressed as a rule with explicit exceptions (e.g., “birds that are not penguins, kiwis, . . . fly”),
because all the exception to this relation must be known beforehand (an inconvenience known as the
qualification problem). It is in this particular regard that DeLP really shines. Its representation of
defaults is quite natural, and even more straightforward than the representantion of defaults in Default
Logic or other nonmonotonic theories.
Remark 6. Let A and B be two situations such that when A occurs, B usually also occurs (that is
to say, if A, then by default B). This knowledge can be expressed in a de.l.p simply by adding a new
defeasible rule B −≺ A.
3.2.2 Weak Conflicts
Sometimes, explicit conflicts (i.e., those arising from complementary situations), or strong conflicts
(i.e., those involving two or more situations that cannot happen at the same time), are not enough to
capture all the conflicts worth modelling in a given scenario. For instance, there is a weaker form of
conflict not covered so far, which we will call weak conflict. This kind of conflict reflects that two
or more situations usually cannot occur at the same time, but exceptionally, they may. Even though
neither explicit conflicts nor strong conflicts can capture this situation, a variation of the previous
solution can be used to model weak conflicts.
Remark 7. Let S1, S2, . . . , Sn be all the situations characterizing a weak conflict. This knowledge can
be expressed in a de.l.p by adding n new defeasible rules of the form ∼Si −≺ S1, . . . , Si−1, Si+1, . . . , Sn,
for every Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Note that it is entirely possible to conceive a scenario were all these situations are met at the same
time, considering the weak nature of this conflict, whereas strong conflicts make such a scenario
outright impossible. It is the existence of this exceptional scenario what distinguishes weak from
strong conflits.
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Example 6. The following de.l.p captures the weak conflict between a sunny day and the fact that it
is raining.
Π ∆
∼sunny -< rainy
∼rainy -< sunny
3.2.3 Assumptions
Some theories incorporate nonmonotonic features by allowing the reasoner to make tentative assump-
tions. This possibility alone gives rise to nonmonotonic reasoning, since an assumption compatible
under certain state of the world may become unfeasible with the addition of new information. For ex-
ample, Bondarenko et al. [2] developed a formalisms built around abductive reasoning following this
approach. Although the nonmonotic features in DeLP are the consequence of the dialectical analysis
performed to determine if a conclusion is warranted, there is a particular kind of assumption, called
presumption, which can also be modelled in this formalism. Bluntly put, a presumption is a default
fact. This notion, first mentioned by Nute in his Defeasible Logic [11], allow the knowledge engineer
to define a set of assumptions or suppositions which may be freely used as long as no other reasons
are raised against them.
Remark 8. Let A be an assumption worth being modeled. This knowledge can be captured in a de.l.p
by adding a new fact F , for a literal F not appearing in that de.l.p, and a new defeasible rule of the
form A −≺ F .
Example 7. Consider the following de.l.p:
Π ∆
bird(X) <- chicken(X) flies(X) -< bird(X)
∼chicken(X) <- ∼bird(X) ∼flies(X) -< chicken(X)
chicken(coco) flies(X) -< chicken(X), scared(X)
assumption scared(coco) -< assumption
According to this de.l.p, flies(coco) is warranted (a conclusion reached under the assumption that
coco was scared). Observe how the addition of the fact assumption and the corresponding defeasible
rule captured the essence of the assumption that coco was scared.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Defeasible Logic Programming constitutes an attractive framework for representing incomplete and
potentially contradictory information, a cornerstone of many real-world problems. As such, the task
of representing the knowledge required to reason upon these problems is not trivial. To that end, in
this article we have developed a methodology for representing knowledge in DeLP, essentially a set of
guidelines covering the major challenges knowledge engineers usually encounter during this phase.
This methodology encompasses two distinctive forms of knowledge representation: first monotonic
knowledge, and then non-monotonic knowledge. For each of them, we have shown how to represented
some prototypical situations using DeLP’s language.
As a future work, we plan to extend this methodology to cover other forms of monotonic and non-
monotic knowledge representation. For instance, we would like to further investigate the different
ways of modelling priorities among defaults, and also take into account other variants of DeLP such
as ODeLP [3] or DeLP∅ [4].
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